A New Method for Avoiding Data Disclosure While Automatically Preserving
  Multivariate Relations by Matloff, Norman & Tendick, Patrick
ar
X
iv
:1
51
0.
04
40
6v
2 
 [s
tat
.M
E]
  3
0 O
ct 
20
15
A New Method for Avoiding Data Disclosure While
Automatically Preserving Multivariate Relations
Norman Matloff∗ Patrick Tendick†
August 22, 2018
Abstract
Statistical disclosure limitation (SDL) methods aim to provide analysts gen-
eral access to a data set while limiting the risk of disclosure of individual
records. Many methods in the existing literature are aimed only at the case
of univariate distributions, but the multivariate case is crucial, since most
statistical analyses are multivariate in nature. Yet preserving the multivari-
ate structure of the data can be challenging, especially when both contin-
uous and categorical variables are present. Here we present a new SDL
method that automatically attains the correct multivariate structure, regard-
less of whether the data are continuous, categorical or mixed, and without
requiring the database administrator to estimate that multivariate structure.
In addition, operational methods for assessing data quality and risk will be
explored.
1 Introduction
Statistical disclosure limitation (SDL) methods aim to provide analysts statistical
access to a data set while limiting the risk of disclosure of individual records. Com-
mon methods include noise addition, swapping of parts of records, replacing data
by synthetic equivalents, suppression of small cells in contingency tables, and so
on [6].
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Long a field of statistical research, in recent years SDL issues have attracted the
interest of computer scientists [4]. There has been a marked contrast in the ap-
proaches taken by the two communities: The statistical view is that of serving
research analysts who wish to do classical inference on samples from popula-
tions, while the computer scientists, coming from a cryptographic background,
have viewed the data itself as the primary focus. In other words, in the computer
science approach, the ‘S’ in SDL has perhaps had lesser attention, compared to
the statisticians’ view of things. However, there is some indication of increasing
interaction between the two groups [1].
For an overview of how methodology has been refined and expanded over time,
compare a 1989 survey paper [2], a 2002 Census Bureau viewpoint [5], the current
statistical view [6], and the more recent computer science approach [4].
Whatever approach is taken, a primary goal remains statistical analysis by the end
user. And in order to perform meaningful statistical analysis on the data, one’s
methods must at least approximately preserve multivariate structure. Most
ststistical analysis — linear regression, logistic models, princple components anal-
ysis, the log-linear model and so on – are inherently multivariate. Unfortunately,
many existing SDL methods place little or no emphasis on this aspect, and this is
an absolutely central issue. Regression coefficient estimates, for instance, can turn
out substantially biased as a result. As noted in [12],
...[in using] noise addition techniques...the original data suffers loss of
some of its statistical properties even while confidentiality is granted,
thus making the dataset almost meaningless to the user of the pub-
lished dataset.
The above statement applies only to independent noise variables. Noise addition
methods can preserve the multivariate structure of continuous variables, if the data
come from an approximate multivariate normal distribution, by adding correlated
noise [10] [8] [14]. However, this does not apply to the discrete-variable case, and
moreover, the same problems apply to most if not all of the other major classes of
SDL methods.
Developing methodology for the mixed continuous/discrete case is a difficult prob-
lem; see [9] and the citations therein for some existing methodology. To broaden
the methods available to Data Stewardship Organizations (DSOs), a new method is
proposed in this paper to deal with the multivariate structure preservation problem.
Our method has several important advantages:
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• The method works on general data, i.e. continuous, discrete or mixed.
• The method does not require the DSO to estimate the dependency structure
between the variables, or make assumptions regarding that structure.
• The method has several tuning parameters, affording DSO broad flexibility
in attaining the desired balance between privacy and statistical usability.
2 Overview of the Method
Let Wij, i = 1, ...n, j = 1, ..., p denote our original data on n individuals and p
variables. Choose ǫ > 0 and 0 < q ≤ 1. Then we form our released data W ′ij as
follows:
For i = 1, ...n:
• Consider record i in the data base:
ri = (Wi1, ...,Wip) (1)
• With probability 1− q, skip the next steps.
• Find the set S of points in the data set within ǫ distance of (but excluding)
ri.
• Draw a random sample (with replacement) of p items from S, resulting in
values akm, k = 1, ..., p,m = 1, ..., p.
• For j = 1, ..., p, set
W ′ij = ajj (2)
and store the released, modified version of ri as
r′i = (W
′
i1, ...,W
′
ip) (3)
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3 Theoretical Justification
Note carefully that the procedure described in the last section does not rely on
knowledge or estimation of the multivariate distribution of our data, a key advan-
tage of the methodology we are proposing here. On the contrary, the components
of r′i are generated independently. The following result shows that the multivariate
structure is (approximately) preserved anyway. For expositional convenience, the
theorem and proof will be stated for the case p = 1.
Theorem: Consider a bivariate random vector (X,Y ) and ǫ > 0. For any t in R2,
let At,ǫ denote the ǫ neighborhood of t, defined by some metric M. Let F denote
the cdf of (X,Y ), and define Gt,ǫ to be the conditional cdf of (X,Y ), given that
that vector is in At,ǫ. Finally, given (X,Y ), define independent random variables
U and V to be drawn randomly from the first- and second-coordinate marginal
distributions of G(X,Y ),ǫ, respectively. Then
lim
ǫ→0
P (U ≤ a and V ≤ b) = F (a, b) (4)
for all −∞ < a, b <∞.
In other words, as ǫ goes to 0, the unconditional bivariate distribution of (U, V )
goes to that of (X,Y ), even though U and V are conditionally independent.
Proof:
Given (X,Y ) = t = (t1, t2),
lim
ǫ→0
U = t1 (5)
and
lim
ǫ→0
V = t2 (6)
Then by bounded convergence,
lim
ǫ→0
P (U ≤ a and V ≤ b) = lim
ǫ→0
E [P (U ≤ a and V ≤ b | X,Y )] (7)
= lim
ǫ→0
E [P (U ≤ a | X,Y ) · P (V ≤ b | X,Y )](8)
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= E [1X≤a · 1Y ≤b] (9)
= E
[
1
X≤a and Y≤b
]
(10)
= P (X ≤ a and Y ≤ b) (11)
= F (a, b) (12)

The key word independent in the above theorem has a major implication: We can
make our released data approximate the multivariate distribution of the original
data (or the population from which the latter are drawn), without knowing or even
estimating the multivariate relationship of our variables. We simply sample
independently from S, yet attain the correct dependency relationship among the
variables.
4 Code and Tuning Parameters
The method provides the DSO with excellent flexibility in achieving the desired
balance between privacy and accurate multivariate structure, via the following tun-
ing tuning parameters:
• The neighborhood radius, ǫ.
• The distance metric M.
• The proportion q of modified records.
Code implementing the method is provided on GitHub, at https://github.com/matloff/statdb.1
The call form is
n b r s ( z , eps , modprop = 1 , wts = NULL)
where eps is ǫ, modprop is q, and the wts argument exerts some control on the
distance metric, to be explained shortly. The return value is the released data set,
in the form of an R data frame (which could be converted to SQL etc.).
1Publicly available software for existing SDL methods includes sdcMicro on CRAN and Web-
Swap at NISS.
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It is assumed that all categorical variables have been converted to dummy variables.
Ordinary Euclidean distance is used on the scaled data, including any dummy vari-
ables. Scaling places all the variables on the same footing — all now have standard
deviation 1 — but there is still a difference between the continuous variables and
the dummies and other discrete variables, as follows.
As sample size n grows (treating the original data as a sample from some popula-
tion), one would want ǫ to become smaller, but this would not work well for the
discrete variables. With large n, the latter would come to dominate the distance
metric, and one could not drop ǫ below some minimum threshhold. The wts ar-
gument provides the DSO with a tool to reduce that dominance, by allowing the
weights of the discrete variables (or others) to decrease as n increases.
If for example we set wts = c(5,12,13,rep(0.6,3)). then in computing distances the
variables in columns 5, 12 and 13 of the data matrix are reduced in weight by a
factor of 0.6.
5 Selection of Tuning Parameters
In some modern statistical methods, the user is faced with selection of a large
number of tuning parameters, both numeric and policy-oriented, such as in the SIS
package [7]. The user may find the task of setting those parameters daunting and
bewildering.
In SDL settings, though, the DSO may welcome the selection of tuning parameters.
The goal is achieving a good balance between statistical accuracy of the released
data and disclosure risk, a difficult task, so from the DSO’s point of view, the more
tuning parameters the better.
5.1 Choices
For a given set of tuning parameters, the DSO wishes to assess
(a) whether the results of statistical analyses on the released data set will be
reasonbly close to those of the original data, and
(b) whether records that were at risk in the original data will be masked suffi-
ciently well in the released data.
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For both (a) and (b), we propose an operational approach.2 For (a), though many
authors have proposed global measures of distance between the original and re-
leased data sets, we suggest gauging the statistical accuracy of the latter in a more
direct manner, motivated by the intended usage of the data, namely statistical anal-
yses.
In other words, under this approach the DSO would run several representative sta-
tistical analyses, say regression and principle components analysis (PCA), on both
the original and released data sets. The DSO would then compare the results.
Our approach to issue (b) is similarly practical. The DSO identifies some represen-
tative unique or rare records, and then tracks what happens to them in the released
data. Have they been hidden sufficiently well?
We advocate these methods (which of course can be used in conjunction with other
methods) because they expose the system in ways that directly address the goals
(a) and (b):
• No matter what SDL method is used – noise addition, cell suppression, data
swapping, our method introduced in this paper, etc. — it will necessarily
result in some distortion to statistical analyses. The fact that two (empirical)
distributions are close of course does not imply that a given functional will
have similar values on those two distributions.
Thus is vital to get a direct idea of how much distortion the statistical users
of the data may need to tolerate. This is what our approach addresses.
• An example in some of the SDL literature has involved preserving the pri-
vacy of the lone female electrical engineer in a company employee database.
The DSO can pose questions like this for their given data set, and find that,
say, while the female EE was hidden, the lone programmer over age 50 was
not, and then continue to search for good combinations of the tuning param-
eters..
5.2 The Roles of n and p
In setting these parameters, the DSO must take into account not only the desired
balance between (a) and (b) above, but also the values of n and p. For fixed p, the
larger n is, the fewer the number of uniquely identifiable individuals in the data,
2We have not seen this in the literature, though it is likely that some DSOs have experimented
with this approach.
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and thus the decreased need for privacy actions.3 On the other hand, for fixed n,
the larger the value of p, the more potential identifiable uniques.
6 Example
We used the Census data set in the package regtools (https://github.com/matloff/regtools)
to simulate an employee database, sampling 5000 records from this data.4
The call used was
> p1p <− n b r s ( p1 , eps = 0 . 3 , wts =c ( 2 , 4 , 5 , r e p ( 0 . 2 , 3 ) ) )
To gauge how close this new version of the data was to the original, we ran a lin-
ear regression analysis, predicting WageIncome from Age, Gender, WeeksWorked,
MSDegree and PhD. The estimated coefficients for the original and modified data
were
data Age Gender WeeksWorked MS PhD
original 447.2 -9591.7 1286.4 17333.0 21291.3
released 466.1 -8423.2 1270.7 18593.9 22161.4
The results are fairly good, differing between 1% and 12% from the original. And
the differences are not bad when viewed in the context of the standard errors of the
original:
Age Gender WeeksWorked MS PhD
52.8 1301.9 38.6 1453.7 3627.7
Presumably we could do better with other values of the tuning parameters. But
what about disclosure risk?
In the original data set, there was one female worker with age under 31:
> p1 [ p1$sex ==2 & p1$phd ==1 & p1$age < 3 1 , ]
age sex wkswrkd ms phd wageinc
3As noted, we are treating the data as a sample from some (tangible or conceptual) population.
As such, the notion of a population unique, seen in some of the SDL literature, doesn’t apply. If
a combination of the categorical variables appears in our data, then by definition that combination
has nonzero probability in the population, and we’ll get more and more individuals of that type as n
grows. For continuous variables, a similar statement holds in the sense that as n grows, we will have
more and more individuals near the given value.
4Since this is just an illustration, the data were not cleaned, and some WageIncome values were
0 that probably should have been designated as missing.
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7997 30 .79517 2 52 0 1 100000
How well was she hidden in the modified data? Quite well, it turns out:
> p1pc <− na . omit ( p1p )
> p1pc [ p1pc$sex ==2 & p1pc$phd ==1 & p1pc$age < 3 1 , ]
age sex wkswrkd ms phd wageinc
12522 30 .5725 2 52 0 1 50000
There is one person listed in the released data of the given description (female,
PhD, age < 31). But she is listed as having an income of $50,000 rather than
$100,000. In fact, it is a different person, worker number 12522, not 7997.5 Where
is the latter now?
> which ( rownames ( p1p ) == 7997)
[ 1 ] 3236
> p1p [ 3 2 3 6 , ]
age sex wkswrkd ms phd wageinc
7997 31 .9746 1 52 0 1 100000
Ah, she became a man! That certainly hides her.
This is just a first try. The DSO could continue, experimenting with various other
values of the tuning parameters. For instance, we tried raising the weight of the
categorical variables:
> p1p <− n b r s ( p1 , eps = 0 . 6 , wts =c ( 2 , 4 , 5 , r e p ( 0 . 3 , 3 ) ) )
The new regression coefficients were generally good:
data Age Gender WeeksWorked MS PhD
relased 506.3 -9323.1 1289.8 17684.1 22019.3
Now there were no workers in the modified data set satisfying the given conditions:
> p1pc <− na . omit ( p1p )
> p1pc [ p1pc$sex ==2 & p1pc$phd ==1 & p1pc$age < 3 1 , ]
[ 1 ] age sex wkswrkd ms phd wageinc
<0 rows> ( o r 0− l e n g t h row . names )
What happened was that worker 7997? She had no close neighbors other than
herself, so her data became NAs:
5Of course, ID numbers would be suppressed.
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> p1p [ 3 2 3 6 , ]
age sex wkswrkd ms phd wageinc
7997 NA NA NA NA NA NA
So again this worker 7997 was protected.
This of course just begins to explore the various tuning parameter values that the
DSO could experiment with, in addition to doing so on other types of analyses, say
principle components analysis.
7 Other Types of Privacy
Another type of privacy may need to be considered. Think of our example of the
lone female electrical engineer in an employee database. Our concern there is that
an intruder may know that she is in the database, and may know enough identifying
information about her that he may be able to determine which record is hers, and
thus gain access to sensitive information. But in some cases mere knowledge that
a given individual is actually in the database can itself be sensitive information.
For instance, consider a cancer patient who wishes to participate in a clinical trial,
but is concerned that his diseased status may become public knowledge. Suppose
further that an intruder knows that this patient was born in Tonga, and that the
intruder is fairly sure that there is only person in the community with that char-
acteristic. Our proposed method may result in some record in the released data
showing a birthplace of Tonga, in which case the nefarious user knows that the
patient does have the disease — even if the record in the released data is not for the
original patient. In such a situation, the DSO may consider excluding this person
from the database, or adjusting some of the tuning parameters.
8 Discussion and Future Work
We have proposed a new SDL method that works for mixed continuous/categorical
data and does not require estimation of multivariate structure. Our brief prelim-
inary exploration seems promising. Much more investigation needs to be done,
with different data sets and more thorough search for good combinations of tuning
parameters.
Note that “a little bit of privacy can go a long way”: As long as the intruder knows
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that the data have been modified (even for the nonsensitive variables), there may
be enough doubt in his/her mind as to make the data useless for nefarious purposes
(while still being very useful for legitimate purposes). Thus, values less than 1.0
for q, the proportion of modified records, will be feasible in some settings. Perhaps
a taxonomy of such settings could be developed.
In databases with large p, one must take into account the Curse of Dimensionality
[3]. The DSO may choose to use a weighted distance metric, with the weights
going to 0 as the variable index goes to infinity [11].
In general, the choice of ǫ must also be made carefully This approach does require
fairly large data sets, so that for instance the set S contains some female workers
in our examples above. One avenue of future research would be to investigate
allowing the value of ǫ to vary from record to record.
Another point to be investigated concerns records on the fringes of the data, say
far from the centroid under our metric M. For such a record, the neighborhood
will likely be empty unless we make ǫ large, which would create its own problems
in terms of statistical accuracy; observations on the fringes of a data set tend to
have high leverage. Alternatively, we could use the k-nearest neighbor method to
form our neighborhoods, guaranteeing that they will be nonempty, but our neigh-
borhoods may again be very large for records on the fringes.
Accordingly, one aspect of future work will involve the efficacy of encouraging
users of the released data to use outlier-robust methods, such as robust regression
and robust PCA.
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